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Mining the Atom: The Cold War
Comes to the Colorado Plateau,

1948-1958
KEVIN J. FERNLUND

In the 1948 issue of Mining Year Book, a trade journal published by the
Colorado Mining Association, the editor opened with a glowing retrospective of the industry. The piece entitled, "Westward Ro," recounted
in a triumphant narrative a century of mining history, from the California Gold Rush to the ~stablishment of the western steel industry. On
this occasion, the association also declared that the "Western movement" was far from over, but wistfully acknowledged that the roughing
it days of the early prospectors had long since passed. I
That same year the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) announced
in a series of circulars that it would purchase-at a ten year guaranteed
minimum price-the uranium content of carnotite and roscoelite ores
from the Colorado Plateau. Prior to these public notices, miners received
only 35 cents a pound for uranium; after they got $3.50. 2 Coming on
the eve of the mining industry's second century in the West, this news
seemed auspicious indeed. For if anything represented the future, it was
uranium. In the years following World War Two, the atom's promise as
a new frontier of opportunity beckoned, just as the lure of other frontiers had before. 3 And with a collective m'emory that tended to recall the
political and financial rewards of past expansions, rather than the societal and environmental costs, the nation entered the Atomic Age with
little to guide it except a deeply held belief in progress.
Caught up in the optimism of the times, the U.S. Bureau of Mines
reported that, "By the end of 1946 there were some predictions that
commercial electric power from atomic prime movers was only about 5
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years away. "4 Besides looking ahead to a world run on this new energy,
the bureau speculated about the potential of the atom in fields as diverse as science, industry, agriculture, and medicine. Thus, the prospects of atomic energy benefiting humankind appeared very promising
in the postwar years. Anxieties over national security and the steady
deterioration of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, however, suggested a very different future for nuclear power. 5
The AEC's decision to create a domestic uranium industry was but a
case in point in this dramatic turn of events.
John K. Gustafson, director of the AEC's raw materials office, recognized the need to develop the nation's uranium resources. He noted
in April 1948 that the nation imported more than three-fourths of its
ores from the Shinkolobwe mine in the Belgian Congo (Zaire).6 In the
event of another world war, even the uranium mines in Canada, which
were another important source of supply for the United States, were
deemed too faraway. Given the relatively low price of uranium on the
global market, the ten-year domestic plan that Gustafson developed
clearly made much'more strategic than economic sense. Whatever the
motive, the director's plan to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency in what
might turn out to be the raw material of the next millennium was greeted
enthusiastically by the mining interests of the Four Corners area of Utah,
Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico, although one of their chief congressional spokesmen, Senator Edwin Johnson of Colorado, was soon
complaining about the government's "pinch-penny" prices for uranium. 7
Long before the start of the Cold War, Southwesterners had mined
uranium at various sites on the 100,000 square miles of the Colorado
Plateau-a land, or rather barrier, situated behind another barrier, the
Rocky Mountains, both of which had divided the torrent of America's
westward expansion like two great boulders in the middle of a stream.
From the standpoint of development, the Plateau, which remained difficult to negotiate well into this century, had at least one redeeming feature: its mineral secrets were relatively easy to uncover. For the geology
of this massive, but deeply eroded, block of uplifted earth was clearly
exposed, or rather, illustrated in a spectacular display of colors, ranging
from dark chocolate browns to luminous whites, including the bright
canary yellow of carnotite, a complex mineral compound containing
radium, vanadium, and uranium. s
As early as 1871, miners of the Colorado Plateau shipped limited
quantities of uranium to Europe. Uranium salts and oxides were used in
several manufacturing processes, but uranium was chiefly valued as a
colorant. Not until 1896 did scientists discover that uranium emanated
invisible rays. Two years later, Pierre and Marie Curie learned how to
separate radium, another radioactive element, from uranium pitchblend,
which was mined in Bohemia. 9
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While uranium excited scientific curiosity for decades to come, radium, which was believed to hold the cure to cancer and other ailments,
became the object of wide interest and great demand. When uranium
carnotite was found to contain radium, the hunt for the rare white metal
was extended to the Colorado Plateau. In the early 1920s, however, the
rich Katanga mines in the Belgian Congo went into operation, a development that quickly killed the American West's _radium industry. Foreign competition, in this case coming from Peru, also stifled the
vanadium industry, although only temporarily. By the mid-1930s, domestic suppliers, backed by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
the Bureau of Mines, and the United States Geological Survey, benefited
from a new demand for this steel-hardening agent. Orders increased soon
thereafter when the United States military armed itself in the fight against
.
the Axis powers. IO
The war dramatically accelerated the production of.many of the
West's minerals, such as copper, lead, chrome, zinc, molybdenum, manganese, and mercury. Uranium was also on the list of strategic minerals.
Not until after the war, however, did the public learn that tiranium was a
key material in the Manhattan Project, a two billion dollar atomic research and weapons production complex under the direction of Major
General Leslie R.Groves, United States Army Corps of Engineers. 1I
Significant amounts of uranium were known to exist in the tailings
left over from the operations of two of the Colorado Plateau's major
vanadium producers-Vanadium Corporation of America as well as U.S.
Vanadium Corporation and Union Mines Development Corporation,
both of which were subsidiaries of Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation. Lieutenant Philip C. Leahy, stationed in Grand Junction, Colorado,
was one of the officers assigned the job of recovering as much "green
sludge" as possible from these tailings. Leahy could not have performed
this task wi thout the advice of local mining experts such as Blair Burwell,
who had previous experience in the radium and vanadium industries. 12
The secret work of the Manhattan Project, which had centered
around the activities of a brilliant group of European and American scientists at Los Alamos, New Mexico, led to the detonation of an atomic
device on 16 July 1945. By 6 August, an American B-29 dropped this
revolutionary weapon on the Japanese city of Hiroshima; three days
later Nagasaki met with the same fate. These attacks instantly killed over
180,000 civilians; thousands more died in the aftermath. This awesome
demonstration of power and loss of life surprised Japan, despite President Harry S Truman's warnings, and convinced the war-torn, but defi- .
ant, empire to accept the Allied terms of surrender. 1J .
One of the effects of keeping the development of the atomic bomb
a closely guarded secret-was the tremendous strengthening of authority
in the United States, be it governmental, military, or scientific. For in
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"harnessing the basic power of the universe," as Truman put it, to bring
a long and costly war to a close, the nation's leaders had proven almost
Olympian in ability and sense of purpose.1 4 Nowhere would this new
and urihealthy trust of power become more evident than in the American West.
During the ensuing Cold War, westerners accepted virtually without question the need for a military-industrial complex, which, in no
small part, had already been built-up in the war against Germany and
Japan. IS With all of its many bases, command centers, proving grounds,
training schools, nuclear test sites, bombing ranges, missile fields, arsenals, laboratories, weapons plants, naval yards, and strategic mining
sites, the West became, in effect, the front line in the forty-year standoff between the United States and Soviet Union. As a result of this extensive military activity, the lands of the American West, in relation to
the rest of the country, bore a disproportionate environmental impact.
The pollution and cleanup problems at Rocky Flats Weapons Plant outside Denver, Colorado, or at the atomic reactors and plutonium plants
in the Richland-Hanford area of Washington, are but two examples of
the environmental damage that will be problematic for decades, perhaps
...
centuries. 16
Of course, a commitment of this magnitude was not made in a re_
gional vacuum. National fears of internal betrayal and preoccupations
with international crises disturbed the American West as much as any
other part of the country. These anxieties were especially acute during
the tense and uncertain time between Gustafson's announcemeht of the
AEC's uranium procurement plan in 1948 and President Dwight D.
Eisenhower's initiation of the Atoms for Peace program and his signing
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, in which private industry and other
countries were invited to participate in the peaceful development of
nuclear power. 17
At the start of this difficult period, the United States began testing a
new generation of atomic weapons during exercises code named Operation Sandstone. These tests were conducted on the faraway Eniwetok
Atoll, in the Marshall Islands. The United States then took the far-reaching step of reactivating the Selective Service System. On the other side
of the world, Communists staged a coup in Czechoslovakia and imposed
a blockade on West Berlin, which Truman countered with a ten-month
airlift of supplies. The next year the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization
was established, tying America's defenses to Western Europe's, a move
the Soviet Union countered by detonating its own atomic device a few
months later. Then, Communists seized power in one of America's old
missionary fields-China. With these developments in Asia, the struggle
against communism became global.
o
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To regain the military and political advantage in this potentially dangerousstruggle, Truman escalated the arms race on 31 January 1950 by
ordering the development of a hydrogen bomb. This decision was followed by a momentous shift in American foreign policy. In April, the
United States assumed the burden of defending the free world. Like the
Republican Party of the 1850s, which opposed the extension of slavery
to the western territories, the National Security Council urged a halt to
the further spread of Communism. This new policy of containment was
tested two months later when North Korea invaded South Korea. True
to its word, the United States entered the war under the auspices ofthe
United Nations. In October 1950, the AEC initiated an ambitious expansion program that enlarged and strengthened each link in the production chain, from the procurement of uranium to the preparation,
manufacture, and final use of fissionable materials. IS
At the same time America was making these global commitments,
fears· of subversion mounted at home. In this regard, various events included the revival of the House Un-American Activities Committee, the
trials of Alger Hiss, the growing use ofred-baiting in politics, Truman's
federal loyalty program, the passage of the McCarran Internal Security
Act, blacklisting, the Klaus Fuchs-Rosenberg case, and the intimidations of Joseph McCarthy. As Eisenhower stated in November 1952,
approximately a year after the explosion of the first thermonuclear device, "Actually we see threats coming from all angles, internal and external, and we wonder what is going to happen to us individually and as
a nation. "19 Out West these anxieties were just as pronounced. The residents of Denver, Colorado, for instance, were subjected to mock air
raids and detailed speculations about how. much damage a hydrogen
bomb would do to their city, while not far from Las Vegas, Nevada, real
atomic bombs were being tested in the desert. 20
The Cold War would continue-with varying degrees of intensityuntil the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The 1950s, however, were an
especially insecure time. 21 As early as 1953, J. Robert Oppenheimer
wrote that in terms of the respective size of the nuclear arsenals of the
United States and the Soviet Union, the superpowers were like "two
scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the
risk of his own life. "22 Learning to live in a stalemate that grew ever
more deadly would be the challenge facing policy-makers and statesmen over the next thirty-six .years.
Great power rivalry was hardly new. The historic antagonism between the French and the English comes to mind, as do the heroic
struggles of the Greeks and Trojans. What clearly set the Cold War apart
from these and other confl icts was that this new set of belligerents had
the power to destroy themselves, and much of the civilized world, in a
single battle. The bomb, of course, changed everything. And at the front
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of the nuclear production line stood the determined uranium prospector, dressed in sweat-stained khaki, wearing a knapsack, and sporting a
Geiger counter. At first glance, this figure appeared to have more in
common with Death Valley Scotty than a soldier in the industrial army
of the United States national security state.
It is true that prospectors, no less than other westerners, were driven
by motives other than loyalty, patriotism, and sacrifice. By maintaining
a vast military-industrial complex, the West won various economic benefits-from high-paying jobs to improvements in infrastructure. 23 Certainly good citizenship was not the overriding concern of the thousands
of uranium prospectors who came to the Colorado Plateau. Contained
in the opening paragraph of a popular prospecting handbook, for instance, was the alluring idea that:
Uranium prospecting offers one of the greatest opportunities of modern times to "strike it rich" without major investment ofcapital, time, or
knowledge.... All over the country, "weekend prospectors" are hunting uranium. The strikes that have already been made prove that even
the novice can prospect for uranium without excessive expense and
training. 24
These prospectors-weekend types or fulltimers-mainly sought, like
the Forty-Niners a hundred years before, to find their fortune and realize, out there among the radioactive outcroppings of the Colorado Plateau, the American Dream.
The Forty-Niners and their latter-day counterparts also had something else in common: they were both actors in the great national dramas of their day. The gold nuggets that the prospectors discovered in
the stream beds of California seemed to vindicate the sacrifices of the
Mexican War, and prove that there was more to the idea of Manifest
Destiny than political rhetoric. By the same token, the uncovering of
significant deposits of uranium on the Colorado Plateau during the worst
years of the Cold War suggested once more that America was blessed
with the "right" resources at the right time. 25
On a more secular level, the uranium "rush" or "boom" of the 1950s
was portrayed as yet one more exciting episode in the go-for-broke history of the American West. From this perspective, the uranium prospector differed little from other western resource finders or users who
became heros, such as the fur trapper, Forty-Niner, or cowboy. In a
sense, viewing the activities that occurred on the Colorado Plateau at
mid-century in terms of the Old West provided the nation with a familiar, if mythic, counterpoint to the frightening realities ofa world on the
brink of nuclear devastation. Along these same lines, trying to satisfy
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the psychological need for reassurance at such an insecure time might
also be one explanation why Americans were enthralled with Western
novels, movies, and television shows. 26
There will always be something compelling about individuals physically wrestling the earth for its riches, despite the environmental wreckage mining left behind-from hydraulic-blasted hillsides in California
to radioactive uranium tailings on Colorado's Western Slope. Not surprisingly, the heroic story of the human struggle with nature has been
the subject of the West's best writers. In the classic travel guide, Roughing It (1872), for example, Mark Twain captured the colorful and expectant, if hard and gritty, life ofthe frontier miner with wit and telling
detail. 27
In Desert Solitaire (1968), Edward Abbey, who bemoaned the ruthless development of Arches National Monument and the loss of wilderness, found the uranium prospector an irresistible figure. Here, after all,
was the common man in a great western setting battling against huge
odds:':""-a rough and unforgiving country, the s-"lperior resources and advantages of big mining companies, swindlers, and numerous safety haz- .
ards. Seduced by the western myth of tbe rugged individualist, however,
Abbey failed to recognize that the uranium rush accomplished at least
as much as "industrial tourism," his bete noire, in bringing
"syphi lization" to the Colorado Plateau. 28
. In the realm of film, the uranium prospector was a real-life western
figure who literally shared the same stage with the western heros of the
imagination. For example, renowned Western film director, John Ford,
often used Monument Valley, situated in the heart of uranium country,
as his main outdoor set. While Ford was out among the spectacular red
buttes and mesas filming such classics as Fort Apache (1948), She Wore
a Yellow Ribbon (1949), Rio Grande (1950), and The Searchers (1956),
miners busily worked the same area, extracting a new kind of lead, for a
new kind ofbu~let, to be used in a new kind of gun, in what might turn
out to be the last of the great showdowns..29
The moral clarity of the Western actually complemented the black
and white ideology of the Cold War. At times, the dividing line between
"savagery and civilization" on which many a Western plot depended
seemed to run right through the national security apparatus. The Central Intelligence Agency certainly saw the world as an intense battle
ground between Communism and Democracy, that is, between the black
and white hats. Such comparisons can be easily overdrawn, and the complexity and ever-changing nature of popular culture in postwar America
all but precluded the reduction of art into government propaganda. Yet,
even in the best artistic examples of the Western genre, films like George
Steven's Shane (1952) and Ford's The Searchers (1956), the message
was clear to an audience raised on Hitler and Tojo: World War Two might
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be over but civilization still had to be ready to fight violence with,vio. lence. Clearly Cold War America needed Shane's fast-draw, backed up
by Ethan Edward's tenacity and grim determination. 3o
Off screen, the country also required the real skills and talents of a
famous frontier type-the bewhiskered prospector. Jesse C. Johnson,
one of Gustafson's successors at the AEC's Division of Raw Materials,
expressed it this way in 1950:
I am convinced that the prospector, like the infantryman, is not outmoded. We still need the prospector to find mineral deposits. The
geologist's technical knowledge is no substitute for the optimism and
persistence of the prospector. 31
According to the Colorado Mining Association, "The greatest asset that
America possesses, as well as the only real atomic secret, is the ability
and ingenuity of the American citizen in rising to an emergency and
performing the task at hand. "32 These sentiments were shared in True
West magazine. In an article entitled "Uranium: 1956," the author declared: "Uranium hunting isajob that has to be done individually; it's a
job cut out for the small-time shoestring operator, for the amateur prospector who's got the guts to buck the long odds with his last few bucks.
Uranium is the one last treasure in the earth that's left for the little guy."33
Here was a chance to get a piece of the frontier before it was too late.
Nearly ten thousand prospectors took advantage of this great opportunity, some of whom were professional hard-rock miners displaced
by the idled lead and zinc industry. On the whole, however, they came
from many different walks of life-grocers, dentists, repairmen, and
school teachers. But not everyone came from distant parts. Mormons,
Navajos, and other locals were also swept up in the mining "frenzy." In
contrast to the footloose stereotype of the prospector, an indefinite number of these fortune-seekers were married. And despite the excitement,
they and their families sought some semblance of domestic order in the
dusty trailer parks that sprang up everywhere. 34
The most famous uranium prospector was Charles Austin Steen,
popularly known as "the Cisco Kid." This hard-headed, down-on-hisluck, and out-of-money geologist from Texas staked a dozen claims,
one of which he named Mi Vida ("My Life") on the Lisbon Anticline in
eastern Utah. Typical of other prospectors, Steen lived with his wife
and four toddlers in a tiny trailer adjoined to an eight by sixteen foot
shack in Yellow Cat Wash, near the little town of Cisco. By 1952, after
years of doggedly overcoming one setback after another, Steen discovered a bonanza of high-grade uranium ore (uraninite) worth millions.
Moreover, Steen succeeded in ~urning this find into a persomil fortune.
News of his strike inspired hundreds of would-be nabobs to try their
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luck in the field; others stayed closer to home and traded in uranium
penny stocks. Not everyone became rich in the uranium rush, and an
unfortunate and undetermined number who were overexposed to radiation while mining ore eventually lost their lives. 3s
In spite of the prominent role the independent prospector played in
the urani um rush of the 1950s, it would be wrong to interpret this event
as yet another grand exercise in rugged American individualism, because at every turn Uncle Sam was there with a guiding hand. Indeed,
the success of the boom depended as much on "socialism" as entrepreneurial capitalism-a curious amalgamation that was peculiarly American.
As Fortune magazine observed, this event was "the first gpvernment-promoted, government-supported, and government-controlled
mineral rush in American history. "36 In addition to providing financial
incentives to prospect and mine, the government allocated funds for
the construction and maintenance of ore-buying stations, for the building of hundreds of miles of access roads, and for an ambitious exploration program that included such innovative techniques as airborne
reconnaissance, carried out on planes equipped with scintillation
counters. 37 Besides the exploratory activities of the AEC, the United
States Geological Survey (USGS) also made an important contribution
in helping prospectors locate uranium.
The USGS, unlike the AEC, enjoyed a long history on the Colorado
Plateau that dated back to the 1870s. After the interruption of World
War Two, the federal agency resumed its historic role, compiling a detailed inventory of the nation's mineral resources that resulted in the
publication of thousands of reports and maps. Nevertheless, for obvious reasons uranium was of special interest. With financial support from
the AEC, the USGS undertook a host of exploratory projects, ranging
from diamond drilling to plant distribution studies in search of the radioactive metal. 38
In 1958, the Atomic Energy Commission's ore-buying program
achieved its goal of creating a native supply of uranium, and the miners
found themselves victims of their own success. The uranium industry,
for example, produced from 60 to 76 million tons of ore in that year
.alone. Initially, most of the mines were located on the western slope in
the Uravan mineral belt. By 1954, however, hundreds of producing claims
were located throughout the Southwest in. Utah, Arizona, and New
Mexico, and on the northern Great Plains in Wyoming and South Dakota. Given this large and rapidly growing supply, the AEC decided on
24 November 1958, to limit further purchases of ore to only those reserves already under contract, an act which marked the end of a mining
boom. 39
. .

354

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

OCTOBER 1994

The uranium industry nonetheless remained optimistic. By the end
of 1958, there were five civilian power reactors in operation, suggesting
that in the near future private demand would supplant the government's
guaranteed market. 40 Moreover, the International Atomic Energy Agency
considered the atom a boon, rather than a curse. Founded 1 October
1957, this agency enjoyed a membership of sixty~five countries. Similarly dedicated organizations included the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS) and
the European AtomiC Energy Community (Euratom).
Within the context of the Cold War, the uranium prospector served
the country's interests and greatly contributed to a thriving peacetime
nuclear industry. Eventually, though, a host of problems engulfed the
nuclear power industry, such as poor reactor designs, high costs, constructiondelays, safety concerns, and waste disposal. The turning point
came in 1979 with the partial meltdown of the reactor core at Three
Mile Island. Whatever hope remained that the industry's reputation and
sense of promise would recover were dashed seven years later by the
disaster at Chernobyl. In a strange way, it was this failed attempt to use
atoms peacefully, rather than being exhausted by maintaining a nuclear
defense, that helped undermine the Communist Party's authority to govern effectively, thereby hastening the end of the Cold War. 41
The Colorado Mining Association was right in 1948. The "Western
movement" was not over. Clearly, the uranium rush shared a number of
the classic characteristics-both good and bad-of previous mining
rushes. But this was only one, and perhaps the least significant, part of
the story of uranium mining and prospectors. In the larger picture of
the Cold War, this colorful episode was one among many that ultimately
led to the victory of the United States over its great Communist adversary.
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